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TAXATION AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY*
J. GREGORY BALLENTINE AND CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR.
A model of corporate financial policy (debt-equity ratios and dividend payout
rates) is included in the Harberger general equilibrium model of incidence of the cor-
porate income tax. Illustrative calcultions of the distortions of financial policy and
increases in risk premiums induced by the corporate tax are provided. Because risk
premiums on corporate securities would be reduced, eliminating the corporate tax or
integrating it into the personal tax would increase the income of noncorporate investors
relatively more than that of investors in corporate securities, and is therefore less re-
gressive than is commonly thought.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been growing interest in some form of integration of
corporate and personal income taxes in the U.S.1 At the same time,
a fairly large body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, has
recently appeared that examines the impact of the differential tax
treatment of debt, equity, dividends, and retentions on corporate fi-
nancial policy.2 Since most types of integration, or even a simple re-
duction of the corporation income tax, would alter such differential
taxation, the conclusions of that literature must form an integral part
of an analysis of the incidence and other effects of integration. Such
an analysis comprises the goal of this paper.3
We modify the two-sector incidence model developed by Har-
berger [1962] to allow for two distinct types of corporate securi-
ties—debt and equity. The return to the latter is composed of two
components—dividends and retained earnings. As in the real world,
corporate income (net of interest payments) is subject to the corporate
income tax. Dividends and interest are subject to the personal tax rate;
*Theresearch reported here is part of the research program in business taxation
and finance of the National Bureau of Economic Research. It was supported in part
by a contract from the Office of Tax Analysis of the U. S. Department of the Treasury
and is reported in greater detail in Ballentine and McLure [1978]. The views expressed
here do not represent those of the U.S Department of Treasury or the NBER. In par-
ticular, this article has not been reviewed by the Board of Directors of the NBER. We
would like to thank Alan Auerbach, Martin J. Bailey, Martin Feldstein, Jerry Green,
Marian Krzyzaniak, Peter Mieszkowski, and Neil Wright for their comments. We are
responsible for any errors that remain.
1. Much of this discussion is summarized in McLureJl979], Ch. 2.
2. See, for example, Tambini [1979], Feldstein [1970], Stiglitz [1973], King [1974],
and Scott [1976].
3. After this paper was essentially completed, a paper by Feldstein, Green, and
Sheshinski [1979] with similar goals, but a different approach, came to our atten-
tion.
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retentions are assumed to be taxed at some fraction of the personal
rate, reflecting the preferential tax treatment of long-term capital
gains. Capital income originating in the noncorporate sector is as-
sumed to be subject to the personal income tax. For simplicity we
assume that the personal income tax is proportionate.4
Because investors do not see corporate debt, corporate equity,
and investment in the noncorporate sector as perfect substitutes, the
net rates of return on these uses of capital need not be equal, or be
affected equally by the corporate tax.5 The principal conclusion of
this paper is that owners of corporate shares bear proportionately
less of the long-run burden of the corporation income tax than do
investors in the noncorporate sector. That is, the corporation income
tax is overshif ted to noncorporate investors, rather than being borne
by all capitalists in proportion to their capital income, as in Harber-
ger's analysis.6 Investors in corporate debt, like corporate sharehol-
ders, bear less of the tax burden than Harberger suggested.7 The
practical significance of these conclusions is, of course, that the cor-
poration income tax is even less progressive than the Harberger
analysis suggests—which itself is less progressive than if the tax were
merely borne by shareholders.
In Section II we describe a simplified model of corporate financial
4. Under a proportionate income tax the case for integration based on vertical
equity largely evaporates. But the arguments based on horizontal equity and distortions
of resource allocation and financial policy retain their force. For a summary of these
arguments, see McLure [1975a].
5. Harberger recognized that the presence of risk can give this result [1962, p. 137],
but chose to abstract from risk in his analysis. While we also abstract from uncertainties
involving price and output, a crucial part of our argument is that the corporation income
tax has a significant impact upon corporate debt-equity ratios, which in turn alters
investors' required risk premiums for investment in corporate securities. For analysis
that considers price or output uncertainty, see Batra [1975] and Ratti and Shome
[1977].
6. This result is suggested by the following quotation from Barzel [1976, p. 1185]:
"The corporate income tax is fundamentally an ad valorem tax. When such a tax is
imposed or raised, it can be evaded in part by switching to corporate financing based
more on debt and less on equity. The risk borne by equity holders will then increase.
The measured rate or return to equity, reflecting this risk, might exceed the change
in the tax rate, giving the impression of more than 100 percent shifting." It seems un-
likely that the return to equity would rise by enough to suggest more than complete
shifting. (Our reference to overshifting should be interpreted as being relative to the
Harberger result of diffusion to all capitalists.) Moreover, Barzel does not mention the
increase in risk premiums paid to debt-holders also induced by the rise in the debt-
equity ratio.
7. The increase in risk premiums may help to explain the extremely high estimate
of shifting of the corporate tax by Krzyzaniak and Musgrave [1963]. Whereas K-M
regressed the profit rate on the tax rate (and other variables), it might have been
preferable to employ two-stage least squares to determine the influence of taxation
on the corporate debt-equity ratio and then regress the profit rate on the tax rate and
the debt-equity ratio resulting from the first stage (plus other variables). Of course,
the speed of adjustment of risk premiums needed to make this a reasonable explanation
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policy in the presence of taxes and the risk of bankruptcy that is
consistent with the main threads of recent literature in corporation
finance. Section III describes how the model of corporate financial
policy can be combined with the standard Harberger model, and
Section IV presents some numerical simulations of the impact of
various tax changes.
II. FINANCIAL POLICY AND TAXES
A substantial body of literature is devoted to the proposition that,
under certain conditions, the value of the firm is independent of the
firm's financial structure, i.e., that there is no optimal debt-equity
ratio.8 An important corollary of this proposition is that (at least at
the margin) the firm will finance its operations entirely from that
source of funds which bears the lowest rate of taxation; that is, that
(at the margin) firms will be financed 100 percent from debt, given
present patterns of taxation.9
Crucial to all demonstrations of the so-called Modigliani-Miller
hypothesis of the irrelevance of corporate financial structure is the
assumption that bankruptcy is impossible. As Stiglitz [1972] has
shown, if there is a positive probability of bankruptcy, corporate fi-
nancial structure is not irrelevant for the valuation of the firm and
there is an optimal debt-equity ratio. Of more immediate relevance
for present purposes, if bankruptcy is possible, Stiglitz [1973, p. 23]
has noted, ".. . thetax advantages of debt would increase the debt-
equity ratio from what it would have been otherwise, but would not
result in the firm going to an 'all debt' position." The corporation
income tax is not, therefore, irrelevant in a world in which bankruptcy
is possible. (See also Scott [1976].)
Our description of the optimal debt-equity ratio is in the spirit
of the analyses by Stiglitz and Scott. But it abstracts from many
complexities in order to simplify the analysis and focus attention on
our key purpose—integrating the corporation financial decision into
a general equilibrium model of incidence.'0 We assume (a) that in-
8. See Miller and Modigliani [1958] for the initial statement of this theorem and
Stiglitz [1974] for a restatement under less restrictive conditions.
9. See Stiglitz [1973] for an elegant demonstration of these conclusions.
10. In particular, Stiglita and Scott use partial-equilibrium analysis to consider
the implications of taxes or the risk of bankruptcy on the firms optimal debt-equity
ratio; but because of the complexity of the problems, they have difficulty obtaining
comparative-statics results, and they make no pretense at general-equilibrium analysis.
By comparison, our description of the risk of bankruptcy is deliberately vague, and
somewhat ad hoc, and is based ultimately upon empirical estimates of key parameters.
But we are able to employ it in a general-equilibrium analysis from which we obtain
comparative-statics conclusions about the incidence and financial effects of taxa-
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vestors are not indifferent to the corporation's debt-equity ratio,
demanding increasing risk premiums on both debt and equity as the
debt-equity ratio rises, and (b) that the firm minimizes the cost of
obtaining whatever quantity of capital it needs by adjusting its
debt-equity ratio. In these two assumptions our approach is almost
identical to that of Tambini [1969].
Corporate capital (Kr) can be financed from either debt or eq-
uity. Let E be that part of the capital stock in the corporate sector that
is financed by equity and B the part financed by debt. Thus,
(1) K=B+E.
There being no corporate tax on interest paid, the cost of debt capital
in the corporate sector (Pbs) is given by the following simple expres-
sion:
(2) Pb=ib(1+tp),
whereib is the net of tax return on debt and t is the personal tax rate
applied to interest payments.'1 At this point we do not distinguish
between retentions and dividends and differences in their taxation.
Thus, the analogous expression for the cost of corporate equity capital
(Pex), to be elaborated further below, is
(3) Pex =je(1+ te),
wheree is the net of tax return on corporate equities and teisthe
aggregate (corporate and personal) tax rate applicable to the return
to corporate equity capital.'2
We can combine equations (1) to (3) to yield the cost of a given
corporate capital stock:
(4) KxPkx =ib(l+ t)B + i5(1 + te)E.
We assume that as the debt-equity ratio rises, investors require
higher risk premiums on both debt and equity. We express this risk
premium as the return on debt or equity relative to the return on
capital in the noncorporate sector.13 Thus, we write
11. In describing the financial sector, it will be convenient to use i, properly
subscripted, to indicate net returns to various forms of investments and to build up
costs of capital from the net returns and relevant taxes. Besides allowing us to avoid
extremely messy notation, this convention helps to highlight the separation of the real
and financial parts of the model discussed further below.
12. The tax rates on dividends and retentions and the dividend payout rate de-
termine t;seealso equation (14) and the discussion thereof.
13. By this we are not implying that the noncorporate sector is riskless, but that
the risk in the noncorporate sector is independent of the debt-equity ratio in the cor-
porate sector and that investors use the return paid in the noncorporate sector as a
benchmark for determining the corporate return they require at different debt-equity
ratios.(5)




14. Because equations (5) and (6) relate relative returns to the aggregate debt-
equity ratio, our description of optimal financial policy might best be thought of as
being based on an assumption that there is a single firm in the corporate sector. Al-
ternatively, one can assume that all corporate firms are identical, that each firm assumes
that its cost of debt and equity depends only on its debt-equity ratio, and that each
firm's assumption as to the effect of a rise in its debt-equity ratio on 1e/,and is
consistent with the aggregate relationship. In this case, equations (1)—(7) apply to each




where i is the net rate of return in the noncorporate sector.14
We also assume that corporations attempt to minimize the cost
of any given amount of capital by choosing an optimal debt-equity
ratio. We assume that in doing so corporate firms take the rate of re-
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from equations (1), (5), and (6) into equation (4) and differentiating
with respect to B (which is essentially equivalent to differentiating
with respect to B/E,sinceB + E =Kis constant), we obtain the
following first-order condition:'5
(7) jb(l + t) —je(1 + te)
+i,,(1+B/E) [g'(B/E)(l+tp)+f'(l+te)] =0.
This expression has a ready explanation. A change in the amount of
capital financed by debt, given the total corporate capital stock, raises
the cost of capital by an amount equal to the cost of debt (the first
term), but reduces it by an amount equal to the cost of equity (the
second term). But the rise in the debt-equity ratio also induces a rise
in the return that must be paid on both corporate securities. Thus,
in total, the cost of capital rises by the difference in the first two terms
plus the third term.
Figure I may assist in understanding our analysis of the firm's
choice of optimal financial structure. In it we measure the fraction
of the firm's capital stock that is debt financed B/(B + E) along the
horizontal axis from the left; the fraction financed by equity is mea-
sured from the right. For expositional ease suppose that 4,= 1.The
curves labeled bandeindicatethe returns that must be paid on
corporate debt and equity at various debt-equity ratios.16
While eandit, indicate the average cost of corporate equity
capital and borrowing, they do not show the corporate sector's mar-
ginal costs of the two sources of finance. In order to illustrate the
choice of an optimal debt-equity ratio, we must add me and mb, the
curves that show the marginal cost of equity and debt, respectively.
In the absence of taxes the intersection of these two curves reveals the
optimal debt-equity combination B/(B + E)*. With that financial
structure the return to equity is i and the interest rate on corporate
debt is i,.
In anticipation of the next section, we can note the effect of in-
troducing a tax applied only to corporate equities. Such a tax would
•15. Note that the level of corporate capital K,, does not enter this equation. This
implies that the optimal debt-equity ratio in our model is invariant with respect to the
level of output or capital employed.
16. Though we have drawn the left-hand intercepts of both ibandi,,toexceed
one (i.e., to exceed i,,), indicating a positive risk premium on both corporate securities
at a zero debt-equity ratio, this has been done only to simplify the diagram; this
placement has no other significance. (In fact, as mentioned in footnote 32 below, our
data suggest that i5 will be less than i,, at a zero debt-equity ratio.) On the other hand,
it is necessary for an interior solution that the left-hand intercept of i be above the
left-hand intercept of b•Otherwise,in the absence of taxes the optimal debt-equity
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cause the m curve to shift upward.'7 The intersection of the new
marginal cost curve (m) and mb occurs further to the right; that is,
the tax increases the optimal debt-equity combination to B/(B+ E).
Moreover,and of especial interest in the analysis of tax incidence, both
e and 1b rise relative to in, as shown by their values at the new optimal
debt-equity ratio i and i. It is for this reason that we say that
holders of corporate securities bear less of the corporation income tax
than Harberger suggests.'8
III. THE COMBINED MODELS
In order to analyze the impact of integration of corporate and
personal income taxes, we have combined the description of corporate
financial policy presented in the previous section with the static
two-sector general equilibrium model referred to in tax literature as
the Harberger model. Because the Harberger model is well-known,
we only sketch its assumptions and the nature of its solution. The
model assumes that there are two sectors (a corporate sector X and
a noncorporate sector Y), made up of perfectly competitive firms
whose production functions exhibit constant returns to scale. There
are two homogeneous factors of production—capital (K) and labor
(L). Demand for the output of each sector is assumed to be a function
of relative output prices and total income. In the usual formulation
of the model, this last condition requires that consumers and the
government divide their incremental expenditures between corporate
and noncorporate output in the same manner. Since we explicitly
recognize retained earnings, we must also add the assumption that
corporations divide their incremental expenditures as do consumers
and the government.19
For analysis of the incidence of the corporation income tax, the
Harberger model typically assumes that there is a single tax on all
corporate capital. The equations of the model are differentiated giving
a linear system of equations that can then be solved to obtain the
elasticity of the net-of-tax rate of return to capital (P8) with respect
17. That upward shift is due to the fact that the marginal cost of equity now in-
cludes not only the increased payments to equity holders but also the tax payments
on equity earnings. Note that when a tax on equity is imposed, the ecurvedoes not
depict the average cost of equity, since it does not include the tax payments.
18. While the net rate of return paid to corporate investors rises relative to that
of noncorporate investors, this occurs only because corporate investors incur greater
risk due to the increased debt-equity ratios. This is briefly discussed below.
19. This assumption allows us to perform balanced budget incidence analysis and
yet to abstract from the expenditure effects of a change in government revenues.358 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
to the tax on corporate capital (tk). Writing that elasticity as
we have20
(8) Ph= flpk,tkX(1-tk),
where carets denote proportionate change (i.e., Ph =dPhIPk).The
formula for is fairly complex and its properties have been dis-
cussed elsewhere. (See Harberger [1962] and Ballentine and Ens
[1975].) For present purposes it suffices simply to note that the for-
mula for 1iPh, includes elasticities of demand and factor substitution,
factor shares, and factor intensities in the two sectors. For reasonable
values of these parameters, flPh,tkisnegative, indicating that an in-
crease in the corporation income tax will reduce the rate of return to
capital.
In addition to the derivation of flPk,tk, there has been some work
simulating the effect of a finite tax change, as opposed to relying on
linear approximations based on 'lPtkX•21Inparticular, one can use
Scarfs algorithm to compute the pre- and post-tax equilibrium values
for all of the variables of the model.22 Alternatively, when the model
has only two sectors, as we assume in this paper, one can, using some
rather tedious algebra, reduce the equations of the model to an excess
demand function of the general form,23
(9) F(Pk,(1 + tk)) =0.
Once one knows the value of Ph based on a value for tkx, the values
of all the other variables of the model are easily calculated. Solving
F (through use of a computer) allows one to determine the impact of
imposing a tax such as t5.
The discussion above has followed previous literature in as-
suming a single tax on corporate capital. That tax formally enters the
model only as the ratio of the cost of capital in the corporate sector
(Pkx) to that cost in the noncorporate sector (Phy). Specifically, one
20. The derivation of flPk,tkunderthe assumption that all tax rates including t
arezero is sketched in Harberger [19621 and developed in more detail in Shoven and
Whalley [1972, pp. 31E,—20] and McLure [1975b]. The assumption that all tax rates are
zero is quite restrictive, particularly for a model dealing with taxation. Ballentine and
Ens [19751 present the general formula for iiPk,tk, which is valid for any value of t.
Aderivation of that formula is available upon request.
21. In order to perform such simulations, one must use slightly stronger as-
sumptions concerning the form of production functions (e.g., that they are C.E.S.
functions) and demand functions.
22. See Shoven and Whalley [1972] for a description of the application of Scarf's
algorithm to a calculation of the effect of the corporation income tax.
23. This still assumes a single tax on corporate capital. Ballentine [1978] gives
the specific formula for the function F and sketches its derivation. The complete der-
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n write, instead of equations (8)and (9) above, the more general
equations,24
IJ Fky =11Pk,tk(Pkx Pk)
and
(9a) F(Pky,Pkx/Pky) = 0.
Inthese equations the formulas for 7lPk,t and F are the same as dis-
cussed above. This result is important because it means that all we
need do is solve our financial model for Pk/Pk,. and, thus, Phx —Pk.
Such a solution can simply be inserted into the Harberger model to
obtain the overall effects of any tax change in our model.
In what follows, we show that we can in fact solve our financial
model for Pk /Pky in terms of the statutory tax rates. And thus we can
consider hypothetical vales for those tax rates (e.g., values consistent
with full integration) to calculate Pk/Ph and then use that value in
the Harberger model as discussed in the above paragraph.
Since the only tax on capital income in the noncorporate sector
is the personal income tax (tn): P, =i(1+ tn). Dividing equation
(4) by and remembering that K =B+ E, we obtain
Pkib B/E 1
(10)Pkifl1+(B/E) in(1+tp)1+ (B/E)
From equations (5) and (6) b/n and e/n are functions of B/E; thus
equation (10) states PhX/Ph)' as a function of BIE and the tax rates.
But if equation (7), which determines the optimal debt-equity ratio,
is divided by i,, it is clear that B/Eisitself an implicit function of t
and te. This means that Pkx/Pky is solely a function of the tax
rates.
If Pix/P#y is a function of the tax rates, then Pkx —Pkyis deter-
mined by the change in the tax rates. To understand the impact of a
tax change, it will be useful to solve for Pk —Phy.Differentiating
equation (1), we obtain
(11) Pkx —Pky=0bEb+ (1tn)] + Oe[te+(1te)]
+ 0b (—7—) [ib(1
+:) je(1 +
t)1 (E —E) —— (1cta),
where °b is Bib(1 + t)I(B + E)Pk, the fraction of the gross return
24. If tk istheon1ytax,thenPh —P,,.. =1+ tk,andPk,/Pk1+ tk,. Further,
PkPky, sincein that case there is no tax in the noncorporate sector.360 QUARTERLYJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
to capital in the corporate sector accruing to bondholders; °eisthe
share accruing to owners of corporate equities.
Differentiating (5) and (6) and inserting them into (11), we ob-
tain
(12)PkxPky= Ob(1 4:t)+ Oe(14:te)(14:tn)
+(Obllb + Oe1e)(— E)
ELb(1+tp)te(1+te)(E—E) E+B ib(l+tp)
where flb is the elasticity of b/n with respect to B/Eandfleisthe
elasticity of e/b with respect to BIE.
Bycombining the two terms that contain (E —E)and using the
first-order condition for the optimal financial policy (equation (7)),
it can be shown that those two terms drop out of the equation. This
is as might be expected. Obviously, a change in BIEdoesnot affect
Pk; thus, 3PkIa(B/E)= 0.Further, since the firm is continuously
choosing a debt-equity ratio that minimizes its cost of capital, the
first-order condition äPh/ô(B/E) =0always holds. Accordingly, our
expression for Pkx —Pkybecomes simply
Pkx Py= Ob(1+ Ip)+ Oe(1 4: te) —(14: ta).
The similarity between this expression and that obtained using the
usual Harberger model,
Pk—Pk= (14:tkx)—(14:tky)
isapparent, and indicates that most of the analytical aspects of
Harberger's model carry over to ours.25 We can focus on the particular
points where we differ, the most important being the distribution of
the tax burden among capitalists as opposed to the more common
issue of the distribution of the burden between capitalists and
laborers.
Before proceeding, we must specify more precisely what is meant
by te.Ratherthan being a statutory tax rate, te is the effective tax rate
on the return to equity. Thus, its value depends upon the statutory
tax rates on dividends and retentions and upon the dividend payout
ratio. Therefore, to determine te in terms of statutory tax rates re-
25. More precisely, we know that if the corporate sector is capital-intensive, then
a rise in t must cause the rate of return in the noncorporate sector to fall. Further, if
both production functions are Cobb-Douglas and the elasticity of substitution in de-
• mand is —1, then the fall in total profits will be equal to the rise in government revenues
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quires specifying the dividend-payout ratio as a function of tax rates.
To this we now turn.
Why corporations pay dividends is a more difficult question than
why they do not finance their capital needs entirely from debt. With
perfect capital markets, retained earnings could be converted to cash,
and shareholders would be more or less indifferent between dividends
and retentions. Retentions would be preferred only because they are
taxed more lightly than dividends; but given differential taxation,
there would be no reason to pay dividends at all.
While it is, of course, possible to develop a dynamic model in
which firms do pay dividends (e.g., Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinkski
1979]), in our model we have chosen a somewhat ad hoc approach.
We assume that at least some investors prefer to take some of their
returns in the form of dividends, while corporate managers prefer to
retain earnings so as to avoid going to capital markets to obtain funds.
As a result, we assume that corporations choose their dividend payout
ratio on the basis of the cost of paying dividends in terms of foregone
retentions. Letting td be the combined corporate and personal tax on
dividends and t,. the combined tax on retentions, that opportunity
cost is given by (1 + td)/(1 + tr).Thus,we write
(13) D/(R + D) =[(1+ td)/(1 + tr)],
whereD represents dividends net of all taxes, and R represents re-
tentions net of all taxes.26
A particular advantage of this formulation is that Feldstein [1970]
has estimated a similar equation. Further, the relationship is con-
sistent with the findings of Brittain [1964] •27
SincejeE =R+ D and je(1 + te)E = R(1 + tr) + D(1 + td), we
have
(14) (1 + te) =[1
—D!(R+ D)] (1 + tr) + [D/(R D)] (1 + td).
26. R is net of the corporate tax and the present value equivalent of the tax
eventually to be collected on capital gains resulting from retentions. It should be noted
that D/(R + D) is not uniquely related to the corporate payout rate, as usually defined.
Net dividends D differ from gross dividends by the amount of the personal tax. Simi-
larly, R is retentions net of the personal tax on the gains they produce. We have chosen
to employ equation (13), rather than an analogous expression in terms of gross dividends
and retentions, because (1) optimal financial policy should be based on net dividends
and retentions, and (2) the concepts of gross dividends and retentions become fuzzy
once we admit the possibility of various schemes of integrating the income taxes. The
second point can be clarified by considering two alternative but equivalent methods
of providing dividend relief. Suppose that retained earnings are constant, If relief is
provided at the shareholder level, gross dividends might appear not to be affected, even
though net dividends rise. But if relief is provided at the firm level, both gross and net
dividends would rise. The formulation of equation (13) avoids this ambiguity.
27. However, Bradford 119771andMiller and Scholes 11979] have recently argued
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With equation (13) this allows us to state te in terms of statutory tax
rates so that the model is fully determined.
IV. THE SIMULATION RESULTS
In the original formulation of the Harberger model, the change
in the real income of capitalists on the side of sources of income could
be expressed as
d(PkK) =PkdK+ KdPk =KdPk.
Since dK =0,by assumption, and capital receives the same rate of
return in both sectors, the change in income on the sources side is
determined entirely by the change in the net return to capital dPk.
Further, a rise (fall) in Pk represents a welfare gain (loss) to
capitalists.
In the present model the interpretation of incidence is somewhat
more complex. This is because the changes in the excess of ib and e
over in, being simply changes in the compensation for risk-taking
needed to induce marginal investors to hold corporate securities, in-
volve no change in welfare for such marginal investors.28 Since i is
assumed to be the rate of return on constant-risk investment, changes
in i could be interpreted as indicating change in the welfare of cap-
italists, whether they invest in the corporate or noncorporate sector.
However, this is not fully satisfactory because, for infra-marginal
corporate investors who are not particularly risk-averse, a rise in b
andi5 relative to i,, as BIE rises does represent a welfare gain. Here
we follow Musgrave's classic definition of incidence: the "change in
the distribution of income available for private use." (See Musgrave
[1959], p. 207.) Under this interpretation, changes in capital income
resulting from hanges in risk premiums are counted like any other
change in income. The true change in welfare will lie between the
results obtained that ignore changes in risk premiums and results that
include all risk premiums as income. However, calculating such
changes in welfare would require a complete model of individual
portfolio choice incorporating differences in individuals' attitudes
toward risk. As the development of such a model goes beyond the
scope of this paper, our calculations include all changes in risk pre-
28. Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski [1979] recognize this same problem. While
we chose to ignore welfare changes and concentrate on income changes, they assume
that the debt-equity ratio is constant; thus risk premiums are constant, and income
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miums.29 Our results and those using Harberger's approach of ig-
noring changes in risk premiums (as is done in our discussion of Table
III below) bracket the true-incidence picture.
Of particular interest for our analysis is the distribution of the
tax burden among capitalists, for it is here that our results differ from
Harberger's. Harberger's conclusion is that corporate and noncor-
porate capitalists share the tax burden in proportion to their share
in total profits. (That is, if noncorporate investors receive 40 percent
of profits, they bear 40 percent of the tax burden on capitalists.) In
presenting our results, we report the share of profits earned by equity
owners,. debt owners, and noncorporate capitalists and the share of
the tax burden borne by the holders of each asset. For example, the
share of net capital income earned by owners of equity is simply
(15) jeE/(jeE + ibB + i0K).
Since this ratio changes as the tax rates change, we report the average
of the pre- and post-tax value. The share of the tax burden borne by
equity is
(16) ELje/(ELje + Bib +
Again the averages of the pre- and post-tax values of E, B, and K are
used.3°
To obtain our numerical results involves solving our model step
by step. First, we use equations (13) and (14) to solve for the effective
tax on equity income te, based on the tax rates t,. and td. Second, we
use a computer to solve equation (7) for the optimal debt-equity ratio,
given (1 + te)/(1 + tn). Third, using the solution for the optimal
debt-equity ratio, we solve for i5/i0 and ib/i0 from equations (5) and
(6) and then (using the value of (1 + t5)/(1 + tn)) solve for the relative
costs of capital Pkx/Pky, using equation (10). Fourth, we solve for Ph,.
29. As mentioned, one alternative approach is to calculate incidence using only
changes in capitalists' income net of all risk premiums (i.e., changes in i,,K). While we
chose to follow the traditional approach in our paper, it may be interesting to mention
here a result that one obtains if one considers only changes in iRK. Capital income taxes
generate government revenues at the expense of all capital income, including risk
premiums. As a result, even in the well-known Cobb-Douglas case, in which capitalists
bear the full tax burden under the traditional incidence approach, the fall in capitalists'
incomes net of risk premiums will be less than the rise in government revenues. The
shortfall is the amount of tax revenues generated at the expense of risk premiums.
Following such an approach, it is not clear who can be said to bear the burden of that
shortfall and, hence, under what circumstances capitalists can be said to bear the whole
burden of the tax.
30. Note that the denominator in this expression is not the total change in capital
income (i.e., it is not the total burden on capital); it omits terms such as (ie— t &E.
This is because it is not clear how that part of the burden is to be allocated among
capitalists. In our results the denominator of equation (16) is always fairly close to the
change in total profits.364 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
based on the value of Pkx/Pky using a computer to solve equation (9a).
Finally, using the computed value for Pky, we can easily solve for all
of the remaining variables of the model. This procedure is followed
for different tax rates, allowing us to determine the impact of alter-
native tax schemes.
The data used for our simulation experiments are discussed in
Ballentine and McLure [1978]. It should be stressed that those data
are not meant to provide an exact description of the U. S. economy
at any particular time; our numerical simulations are probably best
considered as roughly suggestive of the pattern of corporate tax in-
cidence in the United States, rather than as exact estimates.
In addition to our basic data, certain parameter values must be
specified. We present two sets of results, one with the elasticities of
factor substitution in both sectors (S and S,, respectively) equal to
1, the other with S, =S,,=0.5.In both cases the elasticity of substi-
tution in demand Sd is 1. The function relating the dividend payout
rate to tr and td is assumed to take the following form:
D/(R +D)=M[(1+ tr)/(1 + td)1'.
FromFeldstein [1970] We take p as 0.9. (We have experimented with
values as low as 0.5, which King [1971] argues is more appropriate.
Our results were not significantly altered by such values.) Given the
initial values of D, R, tr, and td, the value of M is then determined.
The functions relating b/n and e/fl to BIE are assumed to take
the form,3'
lb/tn = G(B/E) + W
and
= C(B/E)' + V.
We are not aware of any empirical work that would provide us with
estimates for the parameters of these functions. Ballentine and
McLure [1978] provide some sensitivity analysis using alternative
values for the parameters. As shown there, the results reported in the
text are not particularly sensitive to our choice of parameters. For the
present we let = a = 1.4, G = 0.272, and C = 0.187.32 These values
31. The positive constants Wand Y ensure that neither e nor bfallsto zero at
a zero debt-equity ratio.
32. With the initial data these imply values for Wand V of 0.3985 and 1.186, re-
spectively. While oui data set is not intended to provide a precise description of the
U. S. economy, but only to serve as a rough outline of that economy, these two values
are not markedly unrealistic. At a zero debt-equity ratio an initial offering of corporate
bonds is virtually riskless to bondholders and our value for W indicates that they would
require a rate of return that is about 40 percent of the noncorporate return. Equity
holders require a rate of return that is 18 percent above the noncorporate return. This
value may be consistent with corporate-equity holders having less direct information
on and control of the firm in which they buy stocks than noncorporate investors.TAXATION AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 365
are consistent with the observed tendency for debt-equity ratios not
to be radically affected by tax rate changes.
We consider three tax changes; the elimination of the corporation
income tax, full integration of corporate and personal taxes (i.e., ab-
olition of the corporate income tax and full taxation of retained
earnings at the personal income tax rate), and dividends only inte-
gration. The last case involves abolishing the corporate income tax
on dividends, but maintaining it (along with preferential personal
income tax treatment) on retentions. The results of these experiments
are shown in Tables I and II. Since the pattern of the results is similar
for all three tax changes, we shall examine the results of abolishing
the corporation income tax in depth and then summarize the results
for the other two tax changes.
Because we examine the abolition (rather than the imposition)
of the corporation income tax, Table I shows government revenues
declining and the return to capital rising. The change in capital income
as a proportion of the change in government revenues, which can be
considered to be capital's share in the direct tax burden, is 100percent
for S =Sc,,=Sd=1and about 70 percent for S =S=0.5and Sd
=1.For the standard Harberger model the result in the former case
is also 100 percent, while in the latter case Shoven [1976] calculates
capital's share at about 67 percent. Thus, our model suggests about
the same overall burden share for capitalists as does the Harberger
model.
It is in our calculations of the distribution of the burden among
capitalists that we differ from previous work. Whereas the traditional
Harberger analysis would find all capitalists gaining the same relative
amount from the elimination of the corporation income tax, we cal-
culate that corporate bondholders would gain relatively little. That
is, 1brisesby less—and perhaps substantially less—than 10 percent.
Corporate shareholders would gain by a much larger fraction (ierises
by 20—30 percent, depending on the elasticity assumptions), but in-
vestors in the noncorporate sector would gain most of all (i rises by
about 30—40 percent, depending on the elasticity assumptions). This
result, stated from the other side, says that the corporate income tax
is borne mainly by shareholders and noncorporate investors, and
relatively little by corporate bondholders.
Table II presents an effort to quantify the differences in the ways
the various returns to capital are affected by elimination of the tax.
The top part of the table presents, for three tax changes and two
elasticity assumptions, the fraction of total net capital income
accruing to corporate bondholders, holders of corporate shares, and
investors in the noncorporate sector. The bottom part indicates the366 QUARTERLYJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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TABLE III
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES FOR CORPORATE INCOME TAX BY INCOME CLASSES,












0—3 5.6 8.4 9.5
3—5 1.5 2.4 2.7
5—7.5 1.7 2.3 2.5
7.5—10 2.7 3.1 3.3
10—15 2.9 3.1 3.2
above 15 10.6 8.6 7.8
a. Corporate tax is attributed toincomeclasses in proportion toownershipof cornorate shares.
b. Corporate tax isattributed to incc,meclasses inproportionto ownership of capital.
c. Half the corporate tax is attributed in pn,portion to income from corporate securities, half in proportion
to nencorporate capital income. These results are consistent with the average of the resrt)ts for columns (a) and
(d)of Table II.
Source.TableI and Projector and Weiss [1966].
share in the tax burden experienced by investors in each type of
capital. (See equations (15) and (16).) We see that risk premiums Ofl
corporate bonds fall enough with the elimination of the corporate
income tax that bondholders gain little (perhaps 4—5 percent of the
total gain, at most) from the elimination, though they receive some
13 percent of total net capital income. Even corporate shareholders
pay a share of the corporate income tax (46—49 percent) that is
smaller than their share of net capital income (roughly 50—53 per-
cent). Finally, investors in the noncorporate sector are the big gainers
from the elimination of the corporate income tax. Though they re-
ceive only some 35—37 percent of net capital income, they receive
roughly 46—54 percent of the benefits of eliminating the tax.
Table III gives an indication of how much difference the modi-
fication presented here makes for the incidence of the corporate in-
come tax. In columns (a) and (b) the corporate income tax is a]iocated
among income classes in proportion to ownership of (a) corporate
shares and (b) total capital. In column (c) half the tax is allocated in
proportion to ownership of corporate securities and half in proportion
to income from noncorporate capital.33 While the differences in results
33. The capital ownerships series are from Projector and Weiss 11966]. Because
separate series are not available for corporate debt and corporate equity, the burdens
on these two forms of capital ownership were lumped together. "Noncorporat,e" is
primarily housing and agricultural and nonagricultural businesses and professions.
The 50—50 allocation is consistent with the average of results in columns (a) and (d)
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in columns (b) and (c) are not enormous, they do suggest that the
corporate, income tax is somewhat less progressive at the top of the
income scale—and more regressive at the bottom—than commonly
assumed on the basis of the Harberger analysis.
As mentioned above, our approach upon which the calculations
in column (c) are based treats changes in risk premiums the same as
other income changes. Clearly, some of those changes in risk premiums
simply compensate an investor for increased risk without altering his
welfare. But ignoring all changes in b and e relative to in, which is
consistent with the Harberger-type calculations of column (b), omits
the welfare changes of infra-marginal, relatively less risk-averse in-
vestors who gain (lose) as i, and e rise (fall) relative to i. The safest
conclusion to draw from Table III is that the true incidence of the tax
lies between the results of columns (b) and (c). Thus, the qualitative
conclusion that the corporate income tax falls more than propor-
tionately on investors in the noncorporate sector obtains.
The incidence of the corporate income tax is, of course, only part
of the story. In the absence of the tax only some 30 percent of corpo-
rate capital would be debt-financed, instead of 45 percent, as at
present. Stated differently, the ratio B/(B + E) is some 50 percent
higher than in the absence of the tax. Finally, elimination of the cor-
poration income tax does not affect net dividend-payout ratios.34 But
dividends and retentions (both net and gross of personal tax) would
rise by 80—110percent,depending upon elasticities.35 This conclusion
must, however, be qualified in at least two ways. First, we are ignoring
completely how revenue would be recouped. Second, that part of our
model dealing with dividend payout ratios—and any estimate based
upon it—is less satisfactory than other parts of the model. Thus, this
result should not be overemphasized.
The incidence results for full integration are essentially the same
as those for the reduction in the corporation income tax, except that
the changes are smaller in absolute value. This is as might be expected,
since the major difference between the two cases is the higher effective
tax on retained earnings in the case of full integration. That higher
tax on retentions means that the effective tax reduction is less in the
case of full integration. Of course, the original Harberger model does
not deal with this case.
Effects on the debt-equity ratio are also smaller than in the case
of eliminating the income tax. But, whereas eliminating the corporate
34. This is because eliminating the corporation income tax reduces the tax on both
dividends and retentions without altering the cost of dividends in terms of reten-
tions.
35. ARg is the change in retentions gross of personal taxes.37 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
income tax does not affect net dividend-payout ratios, full integration
equalizes the tax treatment of dividends and retentions and causes
the net dividend-payout ratio to rise. Indeed, Dt(R + D) rises from
about 0.150 to 0.174. However, in spite of the rise in the dividend-
payout ratio, net retentions actually rise by about 42 percent, because
of the larger amount of net-of-tax equity earnings.
As our final experiment, we have considered integration for
dividends only. Once again, the incidence results are basically a
dampened version of the results for the abolition of the corporation
income tax. Noncorporate capitalists enjoy some 55—65 percent of the
benefits of dividend relief, despite accounting for only about 41 per-
cent of net capital. Most of the remaining benefits accrue to owners
of corporate equities; under one set of elasticity assumptions, corpo-
rate bondholders lose. Moreover, because integration is extended only
to dividends, the net dividend-payout ratio rises to about 0.2 11. Even
so (gross and net) retentions rise slightly, due to the increase in equity
income net of corporate taxes.
VIII. EVALUATION
Overall the results show that full integration, dividend-only in-
tegration, and abolition of the corporation income tax all lower the
cost of equity capital for corporations. This tends to raise the rate of
return to capital in the economy. However, such tax reductions also
lower the cost of equity capital relative to debt for corporations. In
response, corporations lower their debt-equity ratios. This in turn
reduces the risk premium that must be paid on corporate debt and
equity and thus lowers the observed rate of return on such assets
relative to the return on noncorporate capital. This latter effect tends
to counteract the general rise in the rate of return to capital. Because
the offset is almost complete for corporate debt, the interest rate on
corporate debt remains virtually unchanged. It is less complete for
corporate equity; thus the equity rate of return rises by almost as
much as the noncorporate rate of return. The lesson for the incidence
of the corporate income tax is that owners of noncorporate capital bear
the greatest relative burden, owners of equity bear the next largest
burden in relative terms, and owners of corporate debt pay very
little.
While our model explicitly focuses on the functional distribution
of income and on the distribution of capital income by asset type, the
ultimate concern for incidence analysis is usually the impact of tax
changes by income group. Prior to Harberger's work, many economistsTAXATION AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 371
argued that the corporation income tax is paid by stockholders. Given
the distribution of stock ownership by income class, this means that
the tax was likely to be quite progressive. Since the distribution of
ownership of noncorporate capital, mainly housing and real estate,
is less skewed toward the rich than the distribution of stock ownership,
Harberger's result implied that the tax is less progressive than pre-
viously thought. Our results, which indicate that the tax is "over-
shifted" to the noncorporate sector, imply that the tax is even less
progressive than Harberger suggested, and that integration reduces
progressivity less than is commonly assumed.
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